Trump’s Bangladesh Policy: Strategic Gain or Opportunity Lost?
Washington’s shifting approach from Trump’s ambiguity to renewed strategic focus poses a key question: can Dhaka convert this moment into lasting geopolitical leverage, or risk losing momentum again?
মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্রনীতিতে বাংলাদেশের অবস্থান দীর্ঘদিনই অস্পষ্ট ছিল, তবে ট্রাম্প আমলের সাম্প্রতিক কূটনৈতিক ইঙ্গিতে নতুন গুরুত্বের সম্ভাবনা দেখা যাচ্ছে। এই পরিবর্তন ঢাকার জন্য কৌশলগত সুযোগ খুলে দেবে, নাকি আবারও হাতছাড়া হবে- এটাই মূল প্রশ্ন।
Washington’s foreign policy under the current President Donald Trump follows a strong “America First” doctrine, prioritizing trade, transactional diplomacy, and tighter scrutiny of aid and alliances. This policy directly affects how the United States engages with Bangladesh, a country of growing geopolitical importance in the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific. While Bangladesh occupies a pivotal strategic location linking South and Southeast Asia, the Trump administration’s policies often introduced ambiguity into the bilateral relationship, balancing between economic pragmatism and strategic caution. However, the recent testimony of U.S. Ambassador-designate Brent Christensen before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marks a notable shift in tone. His statement, rich in context and intent, offers fresh clues on how Washington now views Dhaka.
Recognition After Years of Neglect
Christensen began his remarks by acknowledging that Bangladesh “often does not receive the attention it deserves, as it is overshadowed by its even larger neighbors.” The comment, a reference to India and Pakistan and perhaps China, signals a vital admission: Bangladesh has been under-prioritized within previous U.S. regional strategy. This acknowledgment hints at a policy recalibration. Washington appears ready to bring Bangladesh from the periphery to the center of its South Asian policy framework.
Such recognition could serve as a diplomatic opening for Dhaka to re-engage Washington more assertively, provided it can articulate tangible strategic value, from maritime cooperation to participation in regional supply chains.
Experience and Credibility at the Helm
Christensen highlighted his “over twenty years of experience working on U.S. policy toward Bangladesh,” including a prior tour in Dhaka. His profound familiarity suggests that the U.S. may be serious about recalibrating its approach.
Unlike past ambassadorial appointments, which were often symbolic or political, Christensen’s nomination underscores a policy-driven, experience-based appointment. His background positions him to navigate Dhaka’s political complexities and rebuild trust that was strained during the Trump years.
This presents a window for Bangladesh’s interim and future political governments to develop substantive diplomatic dialogues on trade, governance, and defense cooperation.
Strategic Framing of Bangladesh in the Indo-Pacific
Perhaps the most revealing element of Christensen’s testimony was his characterization of Bangladesh as an “important participant in an open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” This marks a shift from earlier administrations: the Obama administration largely framed Bangladesh as a key partner in advancing regional security and countering violent extremism in South Asia, while the Biden administration offers a slightly different emphasis, portraying Bangladesh as a long-standing partner in promoting a free, open, secure, and interconnected Indo-Pacific.
By placing Bangladesh squarely within the Indo-Pacific construct, Washington signals its intent to view Dhaka not merely as a South Asian actor but as a maritime partner vital to regional stability. The phrase “open, secure, and prosperous” echoes standard U.S. Indo-Pacific rhetoric, referring to freedom of navigation, transparent trade, and countering coercive influence, particularly from China.
When questioned by senators about China’s growing military footprint in Bangladesh, including Beijing’s supply of J-10 fighter jets, surface-to-air missiles, and radar systems, Christensen promised to convey Washington’s concerns to Dhaka.
He told the committee he would “engage Bangladesh’s political and military leaders” to explain the risks of deep Chinese military integration. This reinforces a clear message: the U.S. will not tolerate unchecked Chinese influence in Bangladesh’s defense sector and maritime security.
Key Policy Streams Under the Trump Era
1. Aid and Governance
The Trump administration’s America First policy led to freezes and reviews of U.S. foreign aid, including programs in Bangladesh. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) noted that aid reductions risked pushing Dhaka closer to Beijing’s orbit. U.S. interests in promoting governance and labor reforms frequently clashed with Trump’s transactional instincts. Analysts observed that Washington “refrained from imposing severe consequences” on governance issues, prioritizing pragmatism over idealism. This created uncertainty in bilateral cooperation with Dhaka seeking alternative partners, notably China, for development finance and infrastructure.
2. Trade, Economy, and Textiles
Bangladesh’s export-driven economy, particularly its garment sector, depends heavily on U.S. markets. Under Trump, however, trade volatility and tariff rhetoric rattled emerging economies worldwide. While Bangladesh was not a direct target of Trump’s trade wars, analysts observed that uncertainty in global value chains still hurt investor confidence.
Bangladesh’s challenge now is to diversify its export offerings, improve compliance standards, and strengthen its bilateral trade narrative to maintain access and credibility in U.S. markets.
3. Geopolitical Balancing - Indo-Pacific and China
Bangladesh’s strategic location at the crossroads of the Bay of Bengal gives it significant leverage in Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet, its close economic ties with China (including infrastructure and technology projects) create diplomatic tension. Analysts from DAIRA Bangladesh argue that “Bangladesh treads tightropes,” balancing Washington’s expectations for alignment and Dhaka’s own domestic priorities for growth and stability.
This balancing act remains delicate, especially as the U.S.–China rivalry intensifies across South Asia.
4. Burma Act of 2021
The U.S. Congress passed the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021, commonly known as the BURMA Act of 2021, to strengthen accountability mechanisms against Myanmar’s military regime. While primarily designed to address human rights abuses and the suppression of democracy within Myanmar, the scope of this act extends beyond its borders, influencing the geopolitical dynamics of neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, India, and China.
The Act authorizes the U.S. President to impose targeted sanctions on entities like the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to curtail the junta’s financial and military capabilities, especially those used to undermine democratic movements.
Beyond sanctions, the BURMA Act empowers the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to fund programs supporting democracy activists, humanitarian operations, and reconciliation initiatives throughout Myanmar and the broader region. This is not merely rhetorical support, the Act involves substantial U.S. budgetary commitments aimed at fostering a democratic neighborhood in Southeast Asia, which aligns closely with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
From this perspective, a democratic Bangladesh holds strategic importance in reinforcing U.S. regional policy objectives. In the aftermath of Bangladesh’s July 2024 uprising, a shifting political landscape may provide Washington with renewed opportunities to recalibrate its engagement and priorities toward Dhaka, reviving momentum that began during, but remained underdeveloped in, the Trump administration.
Looking Ahead - Post-Trump Equation
For Bangladesh, the Trump years are both a warning and an opportunity. Washington’s shifting priorities made it clear that Dhaka must demonstrate strategic value through trade openness, regional connectivity, and governance reform, if it wants sustained attention from the U.S. For the United States, if it seeks to secure Bangladesh as a stable Indo-Pacific partner, it must move beyond transactionalism and invest in long-term institutional and economic engagement.
As The Daily Star reported, Christensen emphasized that building stronger military and strategic ties with Dhaka will be key to offsetting Beijing’s growing influence. Bangladesh’s future choices, between Chinese infrastructure incentives and U.S. trade-security cooperation, will shape not only its economy but also its geopolitical identity. The Trump administration’s policy toward Bangladesh can best be described as strategically opportunistic rather than deeply strategic. Washington valued Dhaka’s geographic and economic potential but stopped short of sustained engagement on aid, governance, or defense cooperation. Now, with renewed U.S. attention under the Indo-Pacific strategy, Bangladesh has a second chance to reposition itself as a key regional actor.
Whether this momentum evolves into a true strategic partnership or becomes another missed opportunity will depend on Dhaka’s ability to align its diplomacy, economic ambitions, and security posture with shifting U.S. priorities, and on Washington’s willingness to move beyond rhetoric toward sustained engagement. Under the emerging U.S. policy toward Bangladesh, new challenges have surfaced: balancing its deepening military and commercial ties with China, while simultaneously preserving strong trade and investment relations with the United States to sustain economic growth. The strategic direction ahead will likely hinge on Bangladesh’s ability to maintain its ‘strategic hedging’ between Beijing and Washington, pursuing a pragmatic dual-engagement approach that protects national interests within an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific landscape.
About the Author
Dr. Mohammad Imran Hossain (Ansary) is an international security analyst and serving as an Assistant Professor at the State University of New York- Dutchess, and Executive Director, Bangladesh Institute of Development and Security Studies (BIDSS). He can be reached at imran.ansary@gmail.com and mohammad.hossain1@sunydutchess.edu
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect The Insighta’s editorial stance. However, any errors in the stated facts or figures may be corrected if supported by verifiable evidence. | A guest post by
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