Seven DUCSU Elections in 54 Years: Why Governments Fear Student Democracy?
DUCSU was once regular- 14 polls under the British, 16 under Pakistan. But in 54 years, Bangladesh saw only seven times. Why has it become so infrequent? Why do governments fear student democracy?
বাংলাদেশের ৫৪ বছরে মাত্র সাতবার ডাকসু নির্বাচন হয়েছে। অথচ ব্রিটিশ আমলে ২৩ বছরে হয়েছিল ১৪ বার, পাকিস্তান আমলে ২২ বছরে ১৬ বার। কেন ডাকসু এতো অনিয়মিত হলো? সরকারগুলো কি তাহলে শিক্ষার্থী গণতন্ত্রের প্রতি বিরাগভাজন? জুলাই গণঅভ্যুত্থান-পরবর্তী ছাত্ররা কি ভাঙতে পারবে এই অচলায়তন?
The Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU) has long been both a platform for student voices and a training ground for future national leaders in Bangladesh. Yet, despite this historic role, DUCSU elections have remained irregular and frequently suppressed, particularly under so-called democratic governments after the 1990s. This raises a crucial question: why do DUCSU elections fail to be regular, and why do successive governments appear so reluctant or even fearful to hold them?
Historical Background
According to a report, in the last 23 years of British rule (1925–1947), DUCSU elections were held 14 times. During Pakistan’s 22-year period (1949–1970), elections were held 16 times. But after Bangladesh’s independence, the frequency dropped sharply: in more than five decades (1971–2025), DUCSU elections have been held only seven times, despite the 1973 University Ordinance mandating annual polls.
The decline became most visible after the fall of General Ershad’s autocratic regime in 1990. Ironically, while Bangladesh was stepping into a new era of parliamentary democracy, DUCSU elections came to a complete standstill. The so-called democratic governments didn’t hold DUCSU elections. The election did not return until 2019—nearly three decades later when polls were finally held, only to be marred by allegations of irregularities and bias by the ruling party’s student wing Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL). That elected committee’s term expired in 2020, and DUCSU once again went dormant.
It was not until the July Uprising of 2024, which toppled Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic regime, that student representation returned to the national agenda. Under students’ pressure, authorities finally set a fresh DUCSU election date for September 9, 2025.
DUCSU as a Threat to Power
The foremost reason for DUCSU’s irregularity is the enduring fear of student power. Historically, student leaders have mobilized movements that reshaped the country’s political landscape: the 1952 Language Movement, the 1969 Mass Uprising, the 1971 Liberation War, the anti-autocracy protests of 1990, and most recently, the July Uprising of 2024.
For ruling elites, this history is unsettling. A freely elected DUCSU produces independent student leaders who could rally campuses against government policies, turning universities into centers of resistance.
As current Bangladesh Adviser for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Asif Nazrul explains: “The two parties who have ruled the country since 1990 understand the strength of elected students’ unions very well… They fear that if students organize, they would go against them. That is what happened earlier and therefore, the governments do not want DUCSU or other students’ union elections to be held.” This fear has translated into a policy of inaction: better no election at all than risking an empowered, independent student leadership.
Party Student Wings and Monopoly of Power
Another reason lies in the dominance of ruling-party backed student organizations. On most campuses, these groups control leadership positions without elections, enjoying access to resources and influence. Elections jeopardize this monopoly, forcing them to share space with rivals. As Dr. Rushad Faridi of Dhaka University’s Economics Department says: “Whichever party comes to power, its affiliated student organisations do not want elections as they already hold leadership positions on campus. They fear that if elections are held, leadership might pass into others’ hands.” As a result, since 1990, neither major political party has seriously pushed for DUCSU or hall union polls.
The 2019 Example
The 2019 DUCSU election illustrates the risks governments see. Despite widespread allegations of rigging by the ruling party’s student wing, Nurul Haque Nur won the influential VP post. His victory transformed him into a national figure and an outspoken critic of the government. His co-activists including Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud and Akhter Hossain later played leading roles in the July Uprising 2024. For ruling power, this was a cautionary tale: even under a controlled process, student elections could legitimize voices of opposition and shake the throne.
Administrative Subservience
Though Dhaka University is legally autonomous, its administration operates in close alignment with political authority. Vice-chancellor and senior officials are appointed on political considerations, and few want to take risks by organizing elections. Former DUCSU VP Mahmudur Rahman Manna says: “Decision-making is not independent in the university as the Vice-chancellors are appointed under political consideration. They do not do anything that can be risky for the governments.”
Besides, an elected body of student representatives can claim legitimacy, challenge corruption, and mobilize mass resistance. For ruling elites accustomed to tight control, this represents an unacceptable risk. Lawyer Manzill Murshid says: “If the DUCSU election is held, the university authorities cannot take decisions alone. Their absolute administrative power will be curtailed. That is why they don’t want it. And ruling party student organisations also oppose elections because they fear that they may not be elected DUCSU leaders despite being party leaders.”
Structural and Legal Loopholes
Legal provisions also enable irregularity. The DUCSU constitution and the Dhaka University Order of 1973 give disproportionate power to the Vice-chancellor, a government appointee. The constitution designates the VC as the ex-officio president of DUCSU and authorizes the VC to fix election dates and appoint a Returning Officer. This means DUCSU elections occur only when the government permits them. As the governments fear students' voices, they have never allowed the elections to be held since 1990.
The Decline of Student Pressure
Today’s student culture has also changed. For many, DUCSU no longer represents democratic ideals but rather a battleground for partisan politics. With growing career-focused priorities, students often distance themselves from campus activism.
This decline in collective pressure allows administrations to suppress elections with little resistance. Historically, DUCSU revivals have only occurred when students themselves led mass mobilizations– such as in 1969, 1990, and 2024.
As a matter of fact, the irregularity of DUCSU elections is not a coincidence but a deliberate strategy. Governments fear independent student leadership; ruling-party student wings resist losing their monopoly; and university administrations prioritize political subservience over autonomy. Structural loopholes further entrench this status quo, while weakening student activism makes resistance more difficult.
Unless DUCSU’s structure is reformed by removing administrators from executive roles, establishing an independent election commission, and embedding elections into the academic calendar– the cycle of irregularity will persist.
As Dhaka University awaits the scheduled DUCSU election on 9 September 2025, the real question is not whether one election will take place, but whether DUCSU can finally become regularized and institutionalized. Only then can Dhaka University reclaim its historic role as the true nursery of democracy– not just in memory, but in practice.
About the Author:
Mohammed Raihan is a staff contributor to the Insighta. He writes on history, culture, language, economy and geopolitics, uncovering untold narratives that connect the past and present. He can be reached at mohammed_raihan@theinsighta.com
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect The Insighta's editorial stance. However, any errors in the stated facts or figures may be corrected if supported by verifiable evidence. | A guest post by
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