Political Oligopoly: How Power, Not Principle, Drives Bangladesh’s Political Loyalty
In Bangladesh’s oligopolistic political system, activists leave smaller parties not due to ideology but for access to power, resources, and visibility offered by dominant parties like the NCP.
বাংলাদেশের রাজনৈতিক বাস্তবতায় আদর্শের চেয়ে ক্ষমতা, সম্পদ এবং রাজনৈতিক সুযোগই দলবদলের মূল চালিকা শক্তি হয়ে উঠেছে। আদর্শিক ও অপ্রভাবশালী দলগুলো থেকে দক্ষ ও প্রতিশ্রুতিশীল কর্মীরা প্রভাবশালী দলে চলে যাচ্ছেন, কারণ সেখানে রয়েছে রাষ্ট্রীয় সংযোগ, মিডিয়া দৃশ্যমানতা ও ক্যারিয়ার গঠনের সুযোগ। ফলে ছোট দলগুলো ক্রমেই দুর্বল হয়ে পড়ছে, আর কয়েকটি বড় দল পুরো রাজনৈতিক ক্ষেত্র নিয়ন্ত্রণ করছে।
“Every time I convince two people to join my party, three leave for other parties—especially the National Citizens' Party (NCP). My party is falling apart,” lamented Tareq Rahman, former Gano Odhikar Parishad leader and current convenor of Amjonotar Dol, during a recent political talk show. He also alleged that the interim Bangladesh government favors only one student-led political party—the NCP—while ignoring others who also played critical roles in the July 2024 revolution.
His words were not just an emotional admission—they exposed a deeper structural truth about Bangladesh’s political landscape: non-dominant parties are in crisis, not because of bad ideology, but because of bad economics.
In Bangladesh today, political loyalty operates not merely on the basis of ideology or moral conviction. It is increasingly governed by the logic of markets, specifically, the logic of oligopoly. Just as a few large firms dominate certain industries and absorb the best talent, a few dominant political parties concentrate access to resources, visibility, and networks. Whether it was the Awami League before, or BNP, or now NCP during the interim government period—each has functioned as a dominant player in Bangladesh’s political market, attracting talent from other parties with less access to power, regardless of ideological differences.
This isn’t just about newer, non-dominant parties falling apart. A longstanding and widely observed pattern is that many members of leftist and Islamist ideological parties—trained rigorously in their respective student wings—eventually shift allegiance to dominant parties like BNP, Awami League, or now NCP. While these shifts are often viewed as betrayals or ideological compromises, they are better understood through the lens of structural incentives.
This pattern of political migration, whether from ideological or non-ideological parties, reflects the broader structure of incentives shaped by access to power.
Oligopoly Politics: A Market of Power Concentration
In an oligopolistic market, a handful of firms concentrate most of the resources. They possess not only brand power but also preferential access to capital, skilled labor, supply chains, regulatory advantages, and market intelligence. These firms don’t always innovate; they often survive by absorbing innovations and talent developed by smaller players. This gives them a competitive advantage: they can produce more efficiently, absorb talent from smaller firms, and even lower prices to crowd out competitors.
The same applies to political parties in Bangladesh. Dominant parties like the Awami League in the past, and now NCP, leverage their proximity to state institutions, donor channels, media visibility, and patronage networks to create a magnetic field around themselves. These assets act like market capital. They can attract talent from across the ideological spectrum, even from their rivals. Just like employees switch to dominant firms for better pay, growth, and stability, political activists gravitate to dominant parties for career security, influence, and access to opportunity.
Even though the interim government led by Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus is officially neutral and reform-oriented, the presence of NCP-linked advisors has given the party an aura of insider access, making it appear as though it already wields significant power. This perception alone is enough to drive activists, especially those with political aspirations, to abandon their non-dominant affiliations and join NCP.
Cadres for Sale: How Dominant Parties Thrive on Ideological Labor
Bangladesh’s political landscape is witnessing a familiar trend of political brain drain. Just as top students or engineers from developing countries migrate to the West for better opportunities, some of the most capable political organizers, especially those trained in ideological parties like leftist student groups or Islami Chhatra Shibir, are eventually absorbed by dominant political parties. These activists, shaped by disciplined ideological environments, often do not remain with their original “mother parties” (such as CPB, JASAD, or Jamaat). Instead, they migrate toward more resource-rich, electorally promising platforms like BNP, Awami League, or, more recently, NCP. For example, former Jasad leader Shahjahan Siraj joined the BNP in 1995. Recently, former Chhatra Shibir leader Mujahidul Islam Shahin and fromer Chhatra Union leader Anik Roy joined the NCP.
This outsourcing of cadre development has created a paradoxical structure: dominant parties rarely invest in long-term ideological grooming, yet remain electorally strong. Why? Because they function much like large firms in an oligopoly. In the corporate world, big companies often poach experienced employees from startups instead of training them internally. Similarly, dominant parties in Bangladesh benefit from a fragmented political ecosystem where smaller ideological outfits continue to produce high-quality political labor that can be later co-opted.
At the same time, non-dominant but non-ideological parties—such as Gano Odhikar Parishad, AB Party, and Amjonotar Dol—face a different kind of crisis. These parties often attract politically ambitious young leaders with the promise of fresh leadership or reformist agendas. However, lacking both institutional resources and ideological depth, they struggle to retain talent. As these parties remain on the margins of power, their activists frequently jump ship to dominant parties like the NCP, where they perceive greater opportunity and visibility.
Over time, this leads to organizational hollowing. What began as vibrant new movements gradually turned into one-man shows, drained of youth energy, internal democracy, or future pipeline. Ironically, this ongoing talent drain allows dominant parties to thrive without building their own intellectual or ideological infrastructure. They inherit networks, ideas, and organizers without bearing the costs of political training. In effect, they outsource cadre development to smaller parties, then absorb them for free.
In short, the political market rewards dominance, not discipline. And as long as the structure favors resource concentration, non-dominant parties—both ideological and non-ideological—will struggle to remain whole.
Why Voters Also Choose Dominance
This logic extends to voters as well. Just as consumers often choose well-known brands even if they are overpriced or of inferior quality, voters often pick candidates from dominant parties regardless of their personal merit. A corrupt, unqualified candidate from a major party often defeats a principled candidate from a minor one—because voters believe the major party can “deliver.” The dominant party becomes a brand of perceived power.
Staying Outside Power: Fragmentation and Organizational Decay
When a party remains outside power for too long, like the BNP post-2008, it risks losing not only public support but internal cohesion. Activists defect, become politically inactive, or switch parties entirely. This was, in fact, part of a long-term strategy by both the ruling Awami League and its geopolitical ally: to keep BNP out of power long enough so that it would dissolve like the Muslim League. In 2023, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, the former prime minister’s son and a key political strategist for Awami League, publicly stated that “in 10–15 years, there will be no BNP or Jamaat left as political parties.”
Such predictions aren’t baseless. If denied access to power for too long, parties struggle to retain their foot soldiers, mid-level organizers, and even senior leaders. The longer they stay disconnected from the state machinery, the more likely it is that their base will shrink, their influence will wither, and their remaining actors will either switch sides or exit politics entirely.
For activists with political ambition, the decision becomes transactional: Should I stay in a party of ideals, or move to one that gets things done?
Unless the structural incentives change—unless non-dominant parties gain access to platforms, resources, and institutional legitimacy, the logic of the market will continue to override the pull of ideology.
Political Loyalty Follows Power
Political realignments in Bangladesh are often read as betrayals. But they are better understood as rational adaptations to an unequal political economy. Power, like capital, is concentrated. Those who hold it attract resources—leaders, activists, and even voters. In the end, the rational actor—whether an employee, activist, or voter—gravitates toward where opportunity flows.
The challenge for ideological or smaller parties, then, is not just to have “correct” ideas, but to create viable structures that retain talent, provide career incentives, and build the perception that they, too, can win.
Until then, the oligopoly of power will continue. And the migration of cadres from idealism to influence will remain- not a flaw, but a feature- of our political economy.
About the Author:
Sibbir Ahmad is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Economics at the University of Virginia. He can be reached at sibbirahmad520@gmail.com
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect The Insighta's editorial stance. However, any errors in the stated facts or figures may be corrected if supported by verifiable evidence. | A guest post by
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