India-Bangladesh Ties at a Crossroads: The Future of Transboundary Water Diplomacy Beyond 2026
With the Ganges Water Treaty set to expire in 2026, India and Bangladesh stand at crossroads. This timely analysis, explores how the two neighbors can turn a looming water crisis into an opportunity.
২০২৬ সালে গঙ্গা পানি চুক্তির মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়ার প্রেক্ষাপটে ভারত ও বাংলাদেশ এক গুরুতর সন্ধিক্ষণে দাঁড়িয়ে। ক্রমবর্ধমান জলবায়ু সংকট, রাজনৈতিক উত্তেজনা এবং আঞ্চলিক নিরাপত্তার জটিল বাস্তবতাকে কেন্দ্র করে—কীভাবে দুই প্রতিবেশী ন্যায্য পানিবণ্টন, টেকসই উন্নয়ন ও আঞ্চলিক সহযোগিতার নতুন দিগন্ত উন্মোচন করতে পারে, তা বিশ্লেষণ করেছেন ড. মেহেবুব সাহানা।
Irregular rainfalls, excessive groundwater extraction, and reduced flow in transboundary rivers are exacerbating seasonal water shortages in Bangladesh. These shortages are having a serious impact on the country’s food security. As a result, water diplomacy with India has become a major concern for Bangladesh. This issue is especially urgent given the growing effects of climate change and water-related disasters. The Hasina government maintained friendly ties with India. However, that did not alleviate the persisting tension of equitable sharing of water resources. While Bangladesh shares 54 rivers with India, agreements have been signed for only two rivers—the Ganges and the Kushiyara. After more than 13 years of negotiations, the long-awaited Teesta water-sharing treaty did not see any visible progress. Now, the agreement for the Ganges is set to expire in 2026. As the Ganges treaty approaches an end, there is an urgent need for both countries to review their water-sharing deal not to harm their mutual benefits and long-term stability.
History of Transboundary Water Crises
Transboundary rivers and water resources have long been a critical geopolitical issue for Bangladesh. Since its independence in 1971, managing shared water systems has been central to its diplomacy, and the issue has strongly shaped Bangladesh’s relationship with India. Approximately 92% of Bangladesh's land border is shared with India, and over 90% of Bangladesh’s water resources originate from upstream sources, primarily in India. This makes the health of its downstream regions a matter of national concern. The 54 transboundary rivers play a vital role in water supply, agriculture, ecology, and regional cooperation for both Bangladesh and India.
The water management issue began in earnest with the creation of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in 1972. Tensions escalated following India’s operation of the Farakka Barrage in 1975, which sparked massive protests from the Bangladesh side. The famous 1976 Farakka Long March led by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani called for the demolition of the dam. Despite these protests, Bangladesh and India signed a five-year agreement in 1977 on Ganges water sharing at the Farakka Barrage. In 1996, the two nations reached a more comprehensive 30-year treaty under the then Prime Ministers of both countries—Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh and H.D. Deve Gowda of India. They sought to ensure a fair distribution of the Ganges' water during the dry season.
However, India’s non-stop operation of the Farakka Barrage continues to raise serious concerns on the Bangladesh side, particularly over its various impacts on downstream regions, including worsened droughts, increased riverbank erosion, reduced fish production (notably Hilsa), and severe flooding during the monsoon season. Bangladesh, one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries, faces growing water-related disasters, including frequent experience of irregular monsoon and flash floods, mainly caused by climate change. Glacial melt from the Himalayas, combined with extreme rainfall, make the water flow and flooding in major transboundary rivers even worse. - Heavy floods in the northeastern haor (wetland) regions and droughts in the northwest (Barind Tract region) have become more frequent. The overflow of water increases river bank erosion along the rivers of Padma, Meghna, and Jamuna, displacing thousands every year and increasing climate displacement risk.
Feni, Bangladesh – Aug 24, 2024: Flooded main highway and surrounding areas.
Bangladesh complains that the country does not receive its fair share of water, particularly during the dry season. Research by Mohammad Abul Kawser and Md. Abdus Samad, along with a study by Kazi Saidur Rahman and his team, has raised concerns about water shortages. Between 1997 and 2016, Bangladesh reportedly received less water than agreed at the Hardinge Bridge on 94 out of 300 occasions, with guaranteed flows unmet 39 times during critical dry periods. Concerns over data accuracy regarding water availability at the Farakka Barrage and Hardinge Bridge further complicate the issue. In 2019, Bangladesh formally complained to India about treaty non-compliance, while the International Farakka Committee (IFC) advocated for a basin-wide water-sharing agreement. This incident reignited long-standing concerns in Bangladesh over India’s upstream water management. It underscored the importance of improved communication, data sharing, and cooperation between the two countries.
Geopolitical Shifts and Rising Strains in Water Governance
Following the July 2024 uprising in Bangladesh, the political landscape is undergoing significant shifts. These changes appear to be altering the dynamics of the country’s relationship with India. Recently, the interim government in Dhaka criticized India for sheltering former Prime Minister Hasina, who was accused of forced disappearances, atrocities, and crimes against humanity. India’s decision to grant asylum to Hasina has drawn sharp disapproval from various political and civil society groups in Bangladesh. Since the July events, both countries have faced diplomatic tensions on several geopolitical issues. In light of these developments, the future of bilateral relations, particularly concerning water diplomacy, remains uncertain.
The ouster of Sheikh Hasina clearly escalated tensions with India, which had largely benefited from her government. This political shift seems to have further strained the two nations’ water relations. For example, the devastating floods of August 2024 affected 5.8 million people in Bangladesh. Several officials, including Nahid Islam, an advisor to the interim government, accused India of releasing water from the Dumbur Dam in Tripura without prior notice. The International Farakka Committee (IFC) also issued a statement pointing to the sudden opening of sluice gates at both the Dumbur and Farakka Barrages, which contributed to the widespread inundation in Bangladesh. India, however, denied these accusations. It claimed the floods were due to heavy rainfall and said the water release was a natural response to rising water levels.
As tensions over transboundary water management grow, the renewal of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty—set to expire in 2026—has become a pressing issue. While the interim government and various diplomats of Bangladesh advocate for its renewal, there is a sense of urgency surrounding the need to address other outstanding water disputes, notably the Teesta agreement, which has been under negotiation for over a decade. With the political uncertainty in Bangladesh, the outlook for future water diplomacy appears increasingly precarious. After the fall of Hasina’s government, India's interest in renewing the Ganges treaty may wane, further complicating efforts to reach a sustainable agreement. Given the rising geopolitical tensions between these neighboring nations, the need for a cooperative and equitable deal for shared river management has never been more critical. It is incumbent upon both countries to work towards comprehensive, basin-wide agreements to ensure mutual benefit and regional stability in the years to come.
Historic Water Disputes and the Complex Path to Treaty Renewal
Maulana Bhasani led the historic Farakka Long March in May 1976, protesting India’s Farakka Barrage. Bhasani feared it would deprive Bangladesh of its fair share of the Ganges (Padma) waters. The commemoration of the march has grown in significance, with the 48th anniversary in May 2024 sparking renewed calls for equitable sharing of all 54 transboundary rivers. Under Hasina’s rule, India and Bangladesh have made some progress in water diplomacy, with the JRC expanding its scope by adding more rivers for cooperation. At the 2022 JRC meeting, both nations welcomed the formation of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) to study the optimal utilization of water received by Bangladesh under the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty. As mentioned in Article XII, the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty can be renewed by mutual consent.
However, renowned scholar Amit Ranjan, an expert in South Asian water diplomacy, warns that past disputes suggest the renewal process may not be straightforward. The treaty's extension depends on broader diplomatic relations over the past few decades, and several factors make future negotiations even more complex. Firstly, the growing water demand-supply gap in the Ganges Basin, driven by climate change, agricultural expansion, industrialization, urbanization, and population growth, is straining resources. Additionally, groundwater, which accounts for around 30% of the Ganges’ summer flow, is depleting. Secondly, the Farakka Barrage remains a point of contention, with Bangladesh blaming it for water shortages, siltation, and threats to the Sundarbans. Thirdly, the treaty’s political future depends on India’s state politics as well, as seen in West Bengal’s resistance to the Teesta agreement. It has shown how state-level interests can override national commitments. Finally, the recent political shift in Bangladesh has significant implications for India-Bangladesh relations. A stronger push for water diplomacy from Bangladesh’s new leadership is likely to make treaty renewal talks more critical and contentious than in the past. The previous Hasina government, often seen as aligned with India, had stated that Bangladesh would only sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China for the Teesta project if India approved. However, India did not grant approval. Given the current state of India-Bangladesh relations, the interim government may move forward with negotiations with China on the Teesta project to put pressure on India for the renewal of the Ganges Water Treaty.
In a recent interview, the Advisor to Bangladesh’s interim Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change (MOEFCC) voiced concerns over India’s upstream water withdrawals through the Farakka Barrage. These withdrawals have reportedly contributed to desertification in Bangladesh, increased salinity intrusion into freshwater sources, and caused severe environmental degradation, including biodiversity loss. With the Ganges Water Treaty, Bangladesh’s interim government has signaled a firm stance on securing its rightful share of water. Dhaka has even hinted at engaging the international community to address the water crisis, a move that could pose further diplomatic challenges for India. Moreover, internal opposition within India, particularly from West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee continues to complicate water-sharing deals. The recent political shift in Bangladesh has also triggered diplomatic change in West Bengal’s politics, making Banerjee a key stakeholder in the treaty’s renewal due to federalism and its control over the Teesta region. However, renegotiations could strain bilateral relations as both India and Bangladesh tackle mounting water stress from the adverse effects of climate change.
Regional Solutions for Sustainable Water Cooperation in South Asia
Bangladesh faces an ever-growing demand for irrigation water due to its high population density. With a land area of 147,570 sq. km and a population exceeding 170 million, agricultural land is shrinking by 80,000–85,000 hectares annually, intensifying its reliance on irrigation. At the same time, climate change is exacerbating water challenges across South Asia, with increased droughts and floods affecting India’s Northeast, West Bengal, Bihar, and a few parts of Nepal. While overall rainfall is declining, extreme rainfall events are becoming more frequent across the region. These shifts are especially concerning for shared rivers, as the Teesta River’s average discharge has also been decreasing, threatening water availability for downstream Bangladesh.
Adding to these concerns, China's proposal to build the world's largest dam on the upper reaches of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River has raised concerns about downstream water security in India and Bangladesh. The project could disrupt river flow, affecting agriculture, livelihoods, and the ecological balance in lower riparian regions. Further compounding the risks, a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) in October 2023, from South Lhonak Lake caused the collapse of the Teesta III Dam in Sikkim, leading to severe downstream flooding. This disaster highlights the increasing risks posed by climate change and underscores the need to reassess water diplomacy in South Asia, particularly regarding India-Bangladesh transboundary water governance.
In this context, the approaching expiration of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty in 2026 adds urgency to the need for cooperative planning. Both nations must navigate these environmental challenges while determining the future of their transboundary water-sharing agreements. While India, as an upstream country, prioritizes infrastructure projects and hydropower development, downstream Bangladesh remains focused on mitigating the impacts of reduced water flow, droughts, and floods. These diverging priorities reflect the different geopolitical and resource management challenges faced by nations positioned at opposite ends of transboundary river systems. Power dynamics play a crucial role in the water-sharing dispute between India and Bangladesh, influencing political conflicts. Bangladesh remains particularly concerned with water quality, availability, and disaster mitigation, emphasizing the need for sustainable water management and harm prevention.
To address these multifaceted challenges, a practical solution could be the creation of a Regional River Commission (RRC) comprising India, China, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Such a commission would promote cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna and Himalayan-Tibetan river basins, ensuring equitable water distribution and the sustainable management of shared river systems. South Asian countries require stronger regional collaboration, increased investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, and enhanced disaster preparedness to mitigate future risks.
Improved information sharing is also essential. A regional water data-sharing system among common-river nations could improve transparency and reduce conflicts. Beyond government-level action, strengthening people-to-people connectivity and engaging NGOs, think tanks, and activists in South Asia could generate grassroots pressure for fair water-sharing agreements. Moreover, leveraging international media to highlight the consequences of unilateral upstream water control could raise global awareness and garner diplomatic support.
Ultimately, Bangladesh needs a multi-tiered strategy that integrates bilateral diplomacy, regional cooperation, legal mechanisms, and international advocacy to effectively address transboundary river challenges. By adopting a proactive and evidence-based approach, Bangladesh can enhance its negotiating position and secure sustainable water agreements that safeguard the well-being of its people.
About the Author:
Mehebub Sahana, PhD, is a Leverhulme Fellow and Lecturer in GIS at the Department of Geography, The University of Manchester, UK. His expertise lies in transboundary river basin management, socio-ecological resilience, and the socio-political dimensions of land-use dynamics in the Global South. His research delves into the evolving human-environmental interactions, examining their transformation in the wake of colonization, as well as during the post-partition and independence eras.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect The Insighta's editorial stance. However, any errors in the stated facts or figures may be corrected if supported by verifiable evidence.
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